Russia's Interests in the Middle East: Control, Strategies, and the Role of Propaganda
The Arab-speaking region has historically been a key area for geopolitical competition, particularly between Russia and the United States. In recent times, Russia has notably ramped up its efforts to extend its influence in Arab countries by utilizing state-run media and disinformation strategies. This analysis will explore how Russia uses media manipulation to shape public opinion, strengthen alliances, and challenge Western influence in Arab countries.
RT Arabic and Russia’s Role as “Protector and Peacekeeper”
Russia’s role in Syria has been a key component of its media approach in the Arab world. Since 2015, Russia has positioned itself as a major force in Syria’s civil conflict, framing its involvement as crucial in the fight against terrorism and in defending the Syrian state. Russian media in the Arab world frequently supports Bashar al-Assad's regime, depicting Russia as the sole legitimate authority working to counter the disruptive influence of Western countries and their allies.
The swift expansion of numerous state-funded international broadcasters targeting Arabic-speaking audiences in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) reflects an increasing focus on using news media as a tool for public diplomacy, especially in the aftermath of 9/11.
The US government implemented these strategies by launching an Arabic-language radio station, Radio Sawa ("Together"), in 2002, and an Arabic-language TV network, Alhurra ("The Free One"), in 2004. However, these initiatives were not solely driven by the US.
In 2007, Russia followed suit by launching its Arabic service, RT in Arabic. This service competes with regionally funded international broadcasters like Al Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, as well as newer outlets from the same networks, such as Alaraby and Al-Hadath. These broadcasters use carefully crafted narratives to attract and influence Arabic-speaking audiences.
RT Arabic has played a key role in advancing Russia's narrative in the region. In 2018, frequent appearances on the channel included Russian government officials or diplomats warning the "West" against intervening in Syria, accusing them of having hidden agendas, or participating in discussions about Syria with the UN and other international partners. Essentially, Russia was portrayed as the sole power capable of governing Syria while also ‘protecting’ it from external interference.
Figure 1. On March 20, 2018, an article from the RT Arabic website was shared on Facebook and Twitter. "Ribakov: Russia Urges the US to Abandon Plans to Intervene Against Damascus," the caption says.
Note: this was released prior to the chemical assault and the subsequent global debates on how to act.
Disinformation campaigns
Interest in Russian information operations and their political applications has increased following Russia's annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in eastern Ukraine in 2014. Russia has built a specialized infrastructure for information operations, which includes both government-run and state-controlled media channels, some of which operate internationally in local languages (such as RT, Sputnik, etc.). Additionally, Russia sponsors media outlets and websites covertly, alongside its notorious troll farms, which are used to manipulate social media.
Not shy in its use of disinformation, these media channels have utilized various strategies to influence debates in different countries and advance Russian interests. In certain instances, such as in figure 1, Russia has directly presented its perspective on specific issues, portraying its actions as justified and enhancing its image as a powerful state.
Russian Information warfare on social medias
Telegram
Telegram is the main platform that is used to spread Russian messages, due to its loose moderation policies. Some channels have tens of thousands of subscribers, and they grew tremendously when the Ukraine-Russian war started.
The Russian account InfoDefenseArab is an example of the massive growth in subscribers to Telegram channels since the Ukraine invasion. The content of the channel includes updates from the war, international news, as well as disinformation and pro-Russian narratives. These include claims that the US and NATO are responsible for the invasion in Ukraine-Russian war, that the US and NATO are responsible for many wars in the Middle East and even recent Georgia's Tbilisi protest.
The sources of the Telegram channels include official Russian accounts such as the spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, RT, Sputnik and others.
Russia uses RT and Sputnik in Arabic social media profiles to deliver “international news” about different topics, but also to carry propaganda and disinformation. Here are some examples of the main narratives they present:
Tiktok
There seems to be less Russian disinformation on TikTok, but at least one attempt to spread false information was discovered on TikTok that targeted the Russian and Ukrainian population in Israel. On March 2023 in a TikTok video, a profile named “Vlad, the cleanser of Nazism”, claimed that the display of Ukrainian symbols, including the flag is punishable in Israel by a fine of approx. 2,500 Shekels. The false information also appeared in official Russian state media channels such as Pravda and first Russian television channel. The TikTok account still operates with 1597 followers.
Figure 3. A screenshot picture of the Tiktok Channel “Vlad_every2ywy”
Assessment of Russia’s information warfare in the Middle East
Although it is difficult to claim that there is a direct link between Russia’s information warfare and public opinion in the Middle East, some evidence insinuates that it has been successful.
Empiric data supports these arguments as RT Arabic was among the top three most-watched news channels in six Arab countries (Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the UAE, and Iraq) since the beginning of the war. Since their founding, RT Arabic and Sputnik Arabic have posted 180 and 87 tweets each day on average, while Al Jazeera consistently posts 55 and BBC Arabic only posts 32.
Figure 4. A different large-scale study conducted in 2023 that looked at several concerns among Arab youth reveals a negative attitude toward the US.
Alternative theories and conspiracies have a lot of opportunity in a media climate when trust is so low. Second, Arab leaders' goals can occasionally coincide with Russian narratives, which subtly support them. In contrast to the West's lenient stance toward Israel's control of the West Bank, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has denounced the West's double standard for its robust response to the Russian invasion and occupation. Third, the Russian messaging's substance hits on the fundamental elements of Arab identity, including religion and stance on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Fourth, in non-English speaking nations, social media businesses' monitoring and defenses are less robust. Last but not least, the US has historically been at odds with the Arab world because of its backing of Israel and its invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.
In this insightful video, Fırat Köse, a Defense Strategies and International Relations expert, analyzes the significant role of Russian media outlets like RT Arabic and Sputnik Arabic in shaping public opinion across the Arab world. Drawing on his expertise, Köse explores how these platforms, alongside social media, have been leveraged to spread disinformation, manipulate political discourse, and influence perceptions in the region
There are a number of insights that can help us better understand Russian outreach tactics in Arab media as well as the Russian strategy for utilizing those platforms generally.
In contrast to its marginal status in many Western countries, Russian media, especially RT Arabic, appear to have a particularly strong foothold. The information that is currently available indicates that a sizable portion of Syrians, at least those living in the areas that are governed by the government, read and watch its website and TV shows. We might guess as to why this relatively big readership and watching occurs, but it is wrong to infer that this translates into uncritical approval of its content, as other polls show. These figures, however, suggest that Russia may be able to use both its hard and soft power in some contexts. Only Syrian official media that promote some of the pro-Russian storylines can help with such soft power.